

truth that his greatness as a leader does not stem from his excellence alone, but more importantly, from his complete submission to Allah (ﷻ). After all, the Quran affirms the outcome of such an approach in the following verse:

قُلْ إِنْ كُنْتُمْ تُحِبُّونَ اللَّهَ فَاتَّبِعُونِي يُحْبِبْكُمُ اللَّهُ وَيَغْفِرْ لَكُمْ ذُنُوبَكُمْ وَاللَّهُ غَفُورٌ رَحِيمٌ ٣١

Say, [O Muḥammad], "If you should love Allah, then follow me, [so] Allah will love you and forgive you your sins. And Allah is Forgiving and Merciful."

Thupten Jinpa, ed., *Science and Philosophy in the Indian Buddhist Classics, Vol 2: The Mind*, conceived and introduced by His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Somerville, MA, USA: Wisdom Publications, 2020. 554 pp. ISBN 9781614294740.

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My review of Volume 1 of the four-volume *Science and Philosophy in the Indian Buddhist Classics* appeared in *Al-Shajarah*, vol. 26, no. 1 (June 2021) issue. In that review, I promised readers that once I get hold of the second volume, I will try to write a review of it. However, by the time I received a copy of the book – as a complimentary copy from a Malaysian disciple of His Holiness the Dalai Lama – it was too late for me to prepare a review of it to be in time for publication in the December 2021 issue of this Journal. Nonetheless, I am glad that my review of the anticipated volume is now before readers in the present issue of this Journal. In welcoming the first volume, I emphasise the significance that it has for cross-civilisational studies of religion and science. I view the second volume as another significant contribution to the growing literature on such studies. It

will help meet the growing contemporary world need for a truly inclusive global narrative of the history of ideas to replace the Western-centric global narrative that has for too long reigned the academic and scholarly world.

Looking at its content that is wholly devoted to the theme of the Buddhist mind sciences in classical Indian history, I am quite convinced that the volume under review provides solid textual evidence in support of the notion of Buddhist science. The two volumes published thus far provide us with concrete scientific materials that are more than sufficient to argue for the philosophical position that Buddhist science deserves to be treated as another legitimate form of science alongside Islamic and Western, not to mention other sciences that had appeared in world history. But before discussing and evaluating its content proper let me reproduce here the structure and outlines of the volume. Like the first volume, the second is structured in six parts. Part 1, titled “Mind,” discusses four topics, namely the nature of mind, sense consciousness, conceptual and non-conceptual cognitions. Part 2, titled “Mental Factors,” deals with nine dimensions of mental factors. Part 3 has the title “Gross and Subtle Minds,” which is discussed in two contexts, namely “the shared traditions” and “highest yoga tantra.” Part 4 titled “Mind and Its Objects” also has only two parts: one is subtitled “How the Mind Engages Its Objects” and the other “The Sevenfold Typology of Cognition”. Part 5, titled “Inferential Reasoning,” discusses four topics: reasoning and rationality; categories of correct evidence; fallacious inferential evidence; and Dignaga’s *Drum of a Wheel of Reasons*. Part 6, the final part of the book and titled “Training the Mind Through Meditation,” deals with six subtopics: how the mind is trained; calm abiding; analysis and insight; mindfulness meditation; the eight worldly concerns; and increasing good qualities. The volume has a concluding topic titled “The Person or Self.” Each topic treated under one of the six Parts is presented by the Editor as equivalent to a chapter, and thus in all the book has twenty-nine chapters, including the concluding topic.

Apparently, the book treats a wide range of topics pertaining to the mind, consciousness, and reasoning so much so that it may be justifiably viewed as an almost complete work on classical Buddhist

cognitive science. Part 1 helps readers understand the nature and main characteristics of the mind and its properties of cognition, consciousness, and awareness as spelt out in the Buddhist *sutras* in both Mahayana and Hinayana traditions. From the Buddha's own spiritual perspective to be found in his *Dhammapada* it is the taming of the mind or practical psychology that counts the most, since it is what leads to "temporary and final happiness" (p. 40). Also explained in this Part is the difference between sense consciousness and mental consciousness. Sense consciousness is described as nonconceptual, whereas "mental consciousness may be either conceptual or nonconceptual" (p. 66). The difference between conceptual and non-conceptual cognitions is well explained. I see this differentiation of consciousness as quite similar to the one found in traditional Islamic cognitive psychology.

Part 2 seeks to explain in ten chapters (nearly 100 pages) the subtle differences between consciousness, mind, and mentality based on the authority of such Buddhist epistemological texts as Asanga's *Compendium of Knowledge* and Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge*. It carries an interesting discussion on the delicate issue of whether the terms consciousness, mind, and mentality are synonymous or not. It appears from this discussion that there were differences of opinions on the issue between the different authorities or schools of Buddhist philosophy in the field of cognitive science. Asanga's *Compendium of Knowledge* and his *Compendium of the Mahayana* provided definitions or etymological meanings of the three terms in Sanskrit and arguments to show that they are not synonymous. Rather these terms have different referents. In Asanga's expression, *mind* connotes the accumulation of latent potencies of experiences, habits, and so on; *mentality* connotes the basis or that which functions to cognise its object; and *consciousness* connotes that which knows differentiated aspects of its object (p. 97). Interestingly, one classical text is cited in the book as having explained the subtle difference between consciousness and mental factors: "That which sees the object is consciousness; what sees its attributes, the mental factors" (p. 98).

Part 2 discusses nine mental factors, including the virtuous and love and compassion. A chapter in this part (pp. 119-123) is devoted

to the subject of virtues viewed as attributes of the healthy mind. The Buddhist texts pay attention to eleven virtuous mental factors: (1) faith, (2) shame, (3) embarrassment, (4) nonattachment, (5) nonhatred, (6) nondelusion, (7) diligence, (8) pliancy, (9) heedfulness, (10) equanimity, and (11) nonviolence (p. 119). It is noteworthy that in the Buddhist perspective faith and shame top the list of the virtues. Being universal these virtues are also emphasised in Islam and other spiritual traditions. The Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ) spoke of shame as an integral part of faith (*Iman*). To the question “what is shame?” Asanga’s the *Compendium of Knowledge* answers assertively “it avoids wrongdoing out of consideration for oneself. It has the function of acting as a basis for refraining from bad conduct” (p. 120). Muslims who understand and follow Islam could not agree more with Asanga’s moral pronouncement on shame. I see this discussion on spiritual virtues and, in another chapter, on love and compassion as of contemporary significance, since it is approached from the scientific perspective on mind and consciousness.

Part 3 takes readers to a higher, more advanced level of Buddhist treatment or discourse of the mind. I find the discussion here more interesting but also more complex and difficult. It deals with gross and subtle minds or typology of consciousness as understood from the tantric perspective. As pointed out by John Dunne, who wrote the “contextual essays” of the volume, the term *tantra* refers to “a genre of Buddhist literature that was said to be transmitted in secret to a select audience” (p. 201). The tantric texts are distinguished in the Buddhist tradition from the *sutras*, discourses taught to a wide audience, but both are believed to be from the Buddha. Tantric practice is central to all the Tibetan traditions. It is based on texts and methods collectively known as the Vajrayana, which displays two special features: (1) a nondual interpretation of the relationship between mind and body; (2) a set of techniques to manipulate the mind-body system with the view of effecting an inner transformation as envisaged in Buddhism (p. 202). The Vajrayana tantric model is formulated from the perspective of what is known in the Tibetan traditions as “highest yoga tantra.” This perspective is discussed in chapter 16 of the book.

Part 4 discusses “Mind and Its Objects” in two chapters. Dunne aptly titles his contextual essay for this Part “Buddhist Epistemology”. This Part addresses two fundamental epistemological issues, namely the issue of how the mind engages its objects and the issue of typology of cognition, which is identified as sevenfold. Both issues are familiar to Islamic and Western cognitive science or psychology. This Part may serve as a useful source of comparative epistemology between Buddhist, Islamic and modern Western traditions.

Part 5 addresses issues related to the art of thinking or the conditions for correct thinking and reasoning. These issues happen to be also widely discussed in Islamic and Western logical and philosophical traditions. Thus, a comparative study of the three traditions in this particular area of thought is called for. Titled “Training the Mind through Meditation” Part 6 is a kind of manual on the art of meditation as found in the classical texts in the latter Buddhist tradition. It discusses the path of meditation in its various stages and the corresponding transformations of the mind. From the practical point of view, the “eight worldly concerns” discussed in chapter 27 deserve particular attention from “trainees” since, as one text puts it, they “hinder our minds from progressing towards better states” (p. 445). The eight worldly concerns are gain and loss, fame and disrepute, pleasure and pain, praise and disparagement.

The book concludes with a short discussion of the identity of the thing called person, the subject that knows, or the self that says “I” who experienced all kinds of things. This issue is recognised as universal and perennial in nature. What this section seeks to emphasise is that on a number of issues pertaining to the nature and identity of the self, the Buddhist position appears to be unique.

Viewed as a whole, this second volume of *Science and Philosophy in the Indian Buddhist Classics* is a significant contribution to the subject of history and philosophy of science in non-Western civilisations, which may now require us to review the current Western-centric global narrative of the history of science.